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Houser: Crashworthiness: Defective Product Design - Secondary Impact Liab

CRASHWORTHINESS: DEFECTIVE PRODUCT DESIGNSECONDARY IMPACT LIABILITY IN TEXAS
FRANKLIN D. HOUSER*
The purpose of this article is to place in perspective that area of
case law and product litigation dealing with defective design liability
or secondary impact liability--often referred to as crashworthiness in
automobile design litigation. As the term is used in this article, "defective design" means a product perfectly designed, manufactured and
distributed which, because of its very design, constitutes an unreasonable and dangerous risk to the user or others with the foreseeable ambit
of use.
To determine what the courts of Texas will do when confronted
with a crashworthiness issue, the present state of the law of products
liability should be examined.
SUMMARY OF TExAs LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY

In 1967 the Texas Supreme Court in McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
Inc.' quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts2 and stated the Texas
law of products liability to be:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.3
The following extensions, modifications or explanations of product
liability law in Texas have followed:
1. Contributory negligence is not a defense to an established
*Partner, Tinsman & Houser, San Antonio, Texas; J.D., University of Texas.

1 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Sup. 1967), noted 45 TEXAS L. REv. 790 (1967).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

3 McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
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5
case of strict liability, 4 but volenti non fit injuria and misuse
0
of a product are.

of
2. Strict liability may serve as a vehicle for the recovery
7
damages not only to persons but to property as well.
of strict liability is applicable to defective design
3. The doctrine
8
cases.

4. The doctrine of strict liability is not applicable to cases involving economic losses when no physical damage or injury occurs. 9
5. The doctrine of strict liability does not apply to persons
engaged in construction of a product and not its sale.' 0
6. The doctrine of strict liability cannot be invoked or established merely by showing that injury follows the use of a
product."
liability is applicable and extends to all
7. The doctrine of strict
2
defective products.'
8. The doctrine of strict liability extends its protection to byby defective products, as well as
standers who are injured
13
ultimate consumers.
9. When a product has utilitarian as well as dangerous propensities, a seller is required to give directions or warnings as to
its use. When a product which is or may be dangerous is not
sold with proper directions or warnings, it remains an unreasonably dangerous product. Warnings or directions placed
relieve the seller of liability when
on a dangerous product may
14
injury from its use ensues.
Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
5 Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). But see Comment, Economic Coercion As Plaintiff's
Defense to Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Strict Liability Actions, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 379 (1972).
6 General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1966); Jacobs v. Technical
Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), rev'd, 480
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Sup. 1972).
70.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover, 410 S.W.2d 272, 274 (rex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1966), writ ref'd n.r.e., 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
8 Garcia v. Sky Climber, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 261, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420, 424 (rex. Civ. App.Waco 1970, no writ).
9 Thermal Supply, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no
writ).
10 Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Co-op Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931, 937 (rex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11 Hebert v. Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
12 Olsen v. Royal Metals Corp., 392 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1968); Ross v. Up-Right, Inc.,
402 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 848
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
13 Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, writ
dism'd); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
14 Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 858 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968); Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971), rev'd, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Sup. 1972); Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 778 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, writ dism'd).
4 Shamrock
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From these decisions it appears that Texas has been progressive in
giving voice to the economic and social pressures that form the common law relating to products liability.
DUTY

vs. No DUTY

IN CRASHWORTHINESS

The discussion on crashworthiness will be divided into an analysis
of those cases which hold there is no duty to manufacture an automobile that will protect its occupants from the effects of a collision
and those cases which hold there is such a duty.15
THE

No

DUTY CASES

In Evans v. General Motors Corp.' the plaintiff contended that the
"X" frame in his decedent's vehicle had a defective design which made
the vehicle unreasonably dangerous in a reasonably foreseeable impact
situation. The court relied on the no duty rationale to deny recovery.
A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile
accident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle
,'more" safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.
. . . Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to
construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but
that would be a legislative
function, not an aspect of judicial inter17
pretation of existing law.
The court further reasoned:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its
participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may
15 Other jurisdictions which have apparently allowed recovery in design defect cases not
related to automobile design include: California, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962) (the first decision ever to impose strict liability on a manufacturer), where a piece of wood being turned in a lathe flew out of the holding tailstock
and struck the operator in the forehead; Florida, in Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d
299 (Fla. 1965), where the design of the moving parts of a lounge chair amputated the
fingers of the chair occupant; Minnesota, in McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d
488 (Minn. 1967), where the design of a hot water vaporizer would allow its scalding
contents to spill when tipped over; New Jersey, in Savoia v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 211
A.2d 214 (1965), where a hobby horse was held to be defectively designed for failure of the
design to compensate for vibratory dissonance which would result in throwing the rider
off while using the toy; New York, in Gittelson v. Gotham Pressed Steel Corp., 42 N.Y.S.2d
341 (Sup. Ct. 1943), where a spring retainer was deficient in preventing escape of the
injury-causing spring; North Carolina, in Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 131 S.E.2d 601 (N.C.
1963), where steel support trusses were not designed to withstand reasonably foreseeable
"shock" loads.
16 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
17 Id. at 824.
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occur. As defendant argues, the defendant also knows that its automobiles may be driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested
that defendant has a duty to equip them with pontoons.18
It may plausibly be argued that the keystone to the court's error in
this case hinges on the use of the word "possibility." The court in
Evans treats collisions as possibilities only, rather than the certainty
which they are. The court equates the possibility of collisions with the
possibility of vehicles being driven into bodies of water. This comparison is clearly erroneous as to the mathematical probability of
actual occurrence. The law in all modes of litigation has rarely imposed liability or created a duty where only a "possibility" existed as
a result of the exercise of foreseeability.
The appeal in Evans was from a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.
Obviously no evidence was ever heard. The opinion sets out the contentions of the parties and apparently assumes the plaintiff's position
to be as follows: (1) The side rails and a perimeter frame could have
provided added protection (therefore only a possibility of lessened
injury). (2) The "X" frame construction did not prevent the side of
decedent's vehicle from collapsing (this means only a possibility that
another design would have been better). (3) The "X" frame did not
cause the impact nor prevent the decedent's car from being driven out
of the path of the striking car (very elementary). (4) Nor did the
plaintiff contend that the decedent could not have been killed or
injured in this same collision had the 1961 Chevrolet station wagon
been designed with a perimeter frame (thus, only a possibility that any
design existed which could have prevented or minimized the injury
or defects). 19
If these assumptions were based on the plaintiff's case and were true,
the plaintiff probably should not have been allowed to proceed, but
not for the reasons stated. For example, let us assume that the proof
and position of the plaintiff in Evans had been: (1) That side rails and
a perimeter frame would have absolutely prevented any injury or
death. (2) That "X" frame cars always collapse in side impacts even
at low speeds such as 2 m.p.h. and frequently injure or kill occupants
in the car. (3) That the decedent would not have been injured at all
in the collision, let alone killed, had the 1961 Chevrolet station wagon
been designed and equipped with a perimeter frame. With these
findings, could the court possibly have arrived at the same conclusions?
18 Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 825.
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Judge Kiley in his dissent dissected the problem for all to see by
saying:
In my view General Motors' duty was to use such care in designing its automobiles that reasonable protection is given purchasers
against death and injury from accidents which are expected and
20
foreseeable yet unavoidable by the purchaser despite careful use.
He thus recognized that foreseeability, knowledge and common sense
produced a duty. Surely 3,800,000 vehicular accidents a year and
at
55,000 deaths resulting therefrom are of sufficient significance to
21
disaster.
common
least create thoughtful design in view of the
The majority view based on "no duty" would allow the automotive
industry to manufacture their automobiles from egg shells and to use
such designs as would guarantee certain death in every accident, regardless of severity. This position is plainly untenable.
The same decision could have been reached in Evans on the basis
of insufficient evidence, but the court went further than necessary and
held that under no circumstances could a manufacturer be held to
anticipate, and therefore guard against, collisions and their sequela.
However, Evans is not the only decision to announce the bankruptcy
of reason.
In Schemel v. GeneralMotors Corp.,22 the plaintiff sought to recover
from General Motors for designing and building a vehicle capable of
speeds in excess of 115 m.p.h., which was the speed at which his
vehicle had been struck from the rear. The court, in affirming the
dismissal of the plaintiff's action, held that the automobile in question
was not dangerous for its lawful use which is the purpose for which it
was supplied.2 Judge Kiley in another dissent lighted the path again
by saying:
I would hold that General Motors had the duty to foresee that
if it designed its product with a speed capacity far exceeding any
legal limit and emphasized that capacity in its advertising, recklessly inclined drivers would be encouraged to put that capacity
to
to abnormal use and expose innocent persons like Schemel
24
the unreasonable risk that what happened would happen.

In Willis v. Chrysler Corp.25 a summary judgment was granted the
20 Id. at 827.
21 Accident Facts 1971-National Safety Council, Chicago, Illinois, reveals that during

1970 there were 3,800,000 automobile accidents and 55,000 deaths resulting therefrom.
22 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967).
23 Id. at 804.
24 Id. at 810.
25 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
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manufacturer where the only claim was that the manufacturer breached
an implied warranty of fitness because the vehicle broke into two
pieces after impact. It was admitted that the vehicle was involved in a
"high speed" impact. There was apparently no evidence that the
design or manufacture of the car was defective or contributed to the
breaking apart in any respect. The court stated: "This court is of the
opinion that the defendant had no duty to design an automobile that
could withstand a high speed collision and maintain its structural
integrity." 28
It should be noted that this holding is confined to "high speed
collisions." What would the decision have been if the breaking apart
had occurred at an impact speed of 10 m.p.h.? It cannot be believed that
the court would have held the same in the face of a low speed collision.
The usefulness of the speed contrast is to demonstrate that a duty
does exist even though it may be limited. This limit is probably imposed where impacts reach the degree of "high speed," wherever
that is.27
THE DUTY CASES

Fortunately the theory that a manufacturer has no duty to design
an automobile that will withstand the effects of an impact has not
been universally adopted. 28 In Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,29 the
appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal based on the "no duty"
theory. Larsen contended that locating the steering column 2.7 inches
forward of the leading surface of the tires constituted negligence by
enhancing the danger to the driver in a front-end collision. The court
held:
Accepting... that a manufacturer's duty of design and construction extends to producing a product that is reasonably fit for its
intended use ... the issue narrows on the proper interpretation of
"intended use.". . . The manufacturer should not be heard to say

that it does not intend its products to be involved in any accident
when it can easily foresee and when it knows that the probability
over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some
type of injury-producing accident. .

.

.The sole function of an

26 Id. at 1012.
27 Cf. Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Walton v.

Chrysler Motors Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
28 It should be noted that most of the cases which have allowed recoveries for defective
design have only done so where the dangerous propensities were not and could not have
been known by the ultimate user. Predictably, suits involving products with dangerous
propensities that are open and obvious have not generally been successful.
29 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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automobile is not just to provide a means of transportation, it is
to provide a means of safe transportation or as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art.30
The rationale of Larsen was followed in Dyson v. General Motors
Corp.3 1 in which the court found that a duty did exist to design a

"hardtop" convertible roof so as not to be unnecessarily dangerous
in the event of an overturn. The court said:
[I]t is the obligation of an automobile manufacturer to provide
more than merely a movable platform capable of transporting passengers from one point to another. The passengers must be provided a reasonably safe container within which to make the
journey.... [T]he roof should provide more than merely protec-

tion against rain. For example, if the plaintiff's injuries had
been sustained because the roof of the vehicle collapsed under
the weight of a sack of potatoes ... I am convinced that the defendant could properly be held liable for negligent design .... 32
33
Larsen was also followed in Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp.,

in which the plaintiff contended that the location of the gasoline tank
in an MGB automobile created an unreasonable risk to the vehicle
occupants in impact situations. The court refused to dismiss the complaint and after examining the Evans and Larsen positions, said:
I find the reasoning of the court in Larsen... most persuasive
and agree that "[w]hile all risks cannot be eliminated nor can a
crash-proof vehicle be designed under the present state of the art,
there are many common-sense factors in design, which are or should
be well known to the manufacturer that will minimize or lessen
the injurious effects of a collision... ." To adopt the position of
the majority in Evans . . . would be to ignore reality, for the

foreseeability of accidents is a matter of public and common
knowledge. Thus the manufacturer must accept the duty of prouser from unreasonablerisk of injury due to negligence
tecting the
34
in design.
Similarly in Badorek v. General Motors Corp.,3 5 a Corvette sports car's
30 Id. at 501. The same court, however, in Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d
549 (8th Cir. 1968), correctly ruled for the manufacturer and held that an open vent
window when struck by a person's eye in the act of leaning over to peer into a non-moving
car did not constitute a defective product. The court would only require the exercise of
care in the face of some probability, not a mere possibility.
31298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
32 Id. at 1073. See also Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972);
Richmon v. General Motors Corp., 437 F.2d 196 (Ist Cir. 1971); Gray v. General Motors
Corp., 434 F.2d 110 (8th Cir. 1970).
33 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
34 Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
35 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
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gasoline tank was ruptured in a rear-end collision and produced enhanced injuries due to bums. The basis of recovery was sustained upon
the theory of crashworthiness following Larsen.
THE FUTURE

In the unreported case of Bratton v. Chrysler Motors Corp.36 a jury
verdict and final judgment was entered for the plaintiff upon the issue
of crashworthiness liability. The case was subsequently settled for a
substantial sum. The charge of the Honorable John H. Wood, Jr.,
United States District Judge, is explanatory of the fact situation and
correctly states the law as this writer feels it will eventually be interpreted. The names of the participants have been omitted.
All right, ladies and gentlemen, the evidence and the arguments
of the lawyers now having been concluded, I will give you a
verbal charge on the law applicable to the issues of fact which
are submitted to you for determination in this case:
The plaintiffs contend in general that on or about December
15, 1967, A and B, minors, were riding in the back seat of a 1968
Dart automobile being driven by their father . . . . Plaintiffs
further contend that they were traveling at a speed of approximately 35 to 40 miles per hour when said vehicle was suddenly
struck from the rear by a vehicle being driven by D, said automobile being a 1964 Ford. Plaintiffs also contend that the Ford
automobile was traveling at a speed variously estimated at from
50 to perhaps 65 miles per hour, and that the plaintiffs' vehicle
in which they were riding immediately upon impact burst into
flames after which an immediate explosion occurred, during which
the gas tank on said vehicle was ruptured.
Plaintiffs also contend that as a result of the rupturing of the fuel
tank and the explosion, the minor plaintiffs received severe and
disabling burns and injuries to their bodies, which injuries are
made the basis of this suit. Plaintiffs further claim that the vehicle
involved, insofar as the location, configuration, construction and
assembly of the gas tank is concerned, in its relationship to the
spare tire, bumper, differential, "kick up," side and rear frames
are concerned, was defectively designed; in that it was designed,
manufactured and assembled in the automobile in such a manner
as to bring about a rupturing of the fuel tank under circumstances
where a rear end collision occurs and forces the rear bumper,
frames and spare tire into the gasoline tank in such a manner as to
compress it against the differential and rupture the tank.
Now, the essential issues to be determined by you in this case
are these:
36 No. SA-69-CA-369 (W.D. Tex. 1972).
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(1) Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant manufacturers defectively designed and manufactured
the Dodge Dart in any one of the above particulars as alleged and
contended by the Plaintiffs?
If you have answered the above question in the negative, you
will return a verdict for the Defendants.
However, if you have answered the above question in the
affirmative, that the Dodge Dart was defectively designed in any
one of the particulars as contended by the Plaintiffs, and that it
was a producing cause of any injury to the Plaintiffs, then of course
you ... will find for the Plaintiffs unless you find for the Defen-

dants on one of the defensive issues which I will hereinafter
submit to you.
You are further instructed that the words or phrases "Defects"
or "Defectively Designed or Manufactured" as used in this charge
mean where the product, in this case, a Dodge Dart, exposes
the user of such product to an unreasonable risk of harm.
Now, what is the definition of "Unreasonable Risk of Harm?"
It means that the product is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated or foreseen by an ordinary user
who purchases the product with the ordinary common knowledge
in the community as to the characteristics of the product. This
unreasonable risk of harm or injury must occur when the product
is subjected to or utilized in a foreseeable manner in a reasonably
foreseeable environment or state.
In determining what is reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer or seller at the time the product is placed on the market,
you may consider those uses of the product which would be reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer at the time the article was
placed on the market, and such uses as a normal and reasonable
knowledge of human nature and circumstances dictates that said
article would be used in or subjected to in normal use of human
endeavor.
A product is defective if it is "unfit for its intended use." By
the term "unfit for its intended use" is meant a product sold in a
defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or
user; and constituting a danger beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user who purchased it with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to the characteristics of
the product. Proof of a defective condition need not be made by
direct or opinion evidence only. It may also be made by circumstantial evidence as I have defined that term to you heretofore.
The defective condition, if any, must exist at the time that the
product left the hands of the Defendants who manufactured it
and when it was placed in commerce.
If a product like the Dodge Dart in question is misused, that
is, if it is improperly used, or not used in the manner contemplated
by the ordinary user who purchases it with ordinary knowledge
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common to the community and to the public as to the characteristics of the product, then the Defendants who manufactured it
would not be liable under the law. In this connection, a manufacturer of a product is entitled to assume that the Dodge Dart
would not be subjected to abnormal or improper use or handling,
and of course the Defendants would not be liable if their injuries
resulted from abnormal use or handling. If you find, therefore,
from a preponderance of the evidence that the Dodge Dart was
improperly used, then you will find for the Defendants.
You are further instructed that the Defendants do not have the
duty to design, manufacture or sell the product here in question
so as to absolutely prevent any and all injuries resulting from rear
end collisions, but you are instructed that the Defendants do have
a duty to design, manufacture and sell the product here in question in a manner so as to prevent or minimize any and all
damages or injuries which result from vehicular collisions which
are reasonably foreseeable from the reasonably anticipated use,
in the environment in which the product will in all reasonable
probability be operated or used. You are further instructed that
the Defendants have a duty to design, manufacture and sell the
product in such manner as to not expose the users of said product
to an unreasonable risk of harm, as I have defined the term to
you, and which is beyond that risk which would be contemplated
by the ordinary user who purchases it with ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. While the
manufacturer of a product is not expected under the law to manufacture an automobile which is so called "completely fire-proof,"
the product must be designed and manufactured in a manner
which would not render its use "unreasonably dangerous."
Now "unreasonably dangerous" is defined as follows: For the
product to be "unreasonably dangerous," as that term is used
herein, the product must be dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by an ordinary consumer who
purchases the vehicle with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to the characteristics of a product of the type
purchased.
On the other hand, as I have said, the Defendant is entitled to
assume that its product will be put to a normal use for which
the product is intended.
I will give you the summary of liability in this products liability
case as follows:
Bearing in mind the admissibility of the evidence herein, you
are instructed that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the time the Dodge Dart in question left the hands
of the Defendants who manufactured the product and it was at
that time in a defective condition by reason of defective design
or manufacture in any one or more of the particulars alleged
by the Plaintiffs, rendering the product unfit for its intended
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use and that such defective condition was the producing cause of
any injuries, or damages to the Plaintiffs as alleged, you will find
for the Plaintiffs, unless you find for the Defendants on one of
the defensive issues submitted.
On the other hand, ladies and gentlemen, if the Plaintiffs have
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
product left the hands of the Defendants in a defective condition,
making the product unfit for its intended use, and that such defects, if any, were the producing cause of any injuries or damages
to Plaintiffs, then you will find for the Defendants. Further, if
you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Dodge
Dart in question was misused, as that term has been explained to
you, and that such misuse, if any, was a proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs' injuries and damages, if any, then you will find for the
Defendants.
Also, in this connection you are instructed that the Plaintiffs
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the acts of Defendant in striking the Plaintiffs' vehicle from
the rear were not the sole proximate cause of the injuries of the
Plaintiffs.
In this connection, if you find that such act of Defendant in
striking the Plaintiffs' vehicle from the rear was the sole proximate
cause of the injuries suffered by the Plaintiffs, then you will find
for the Defendants.
Any lawyer who would urge a crashworthiness case would do well
to heed the experience of the cases and include the following propositions in his contentions and offer of proof. Anyone defending such
cases would probably find his time most usefully spent in proving the
converse of each proposition, except as to numbers two and three.
1. Prove a defect in design, that is, a feature of design which is
unreasonably dangerous.
2. Admit that the claimed design defect did not cause the initial
impact or original injury, if any.
3. Admit that the product is perfectly manufactured.
4. Prove that the product was being used: (a) as specifically intended, or (b) as should have been reasonably anticipated by
the manufacturer, or (c) in a reasonably foreseeable environment.
5. Prove that the design defect operates in such a manner to
cause injury, and such injury is scientifically predictable when
the product is in use.
6. Prove that the injuries received from the original impact are
minor when compared to the injury produced by the secondary
impact or defective design.
7. Prove that reasonable methods or alternatives are available
to replace the defective design which would prevent or mini-

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

11

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 4 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

314

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL
mize the effects of the defective design in a secondary impact
situation.

If these criteria are met it is reasonably certain that the Texas courts
will follow the Larsen line of cases and allow recovery.
CONCLUSION

The courts of Texas are in the forefront of the judicial advancement
of the common law of products liability. This advance has not been
one which could be characterized as radical or reactionary, but rather
the slow measured step of progress tempered with increased experience
and awareness. The day of defective design is here, secondary impact
and crashworthiness are on the eastern horizon.
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